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Abstract
The invisibility of information precludes a direct test of attention allocation theories.
To surmount this obstacle, we develop a model that uses an observable variable – the
state of the business cycle – to predict attention allocation. Attention allocation, in
turn, predicts aggregate investment patterns. Because the theory begins and ends with
observable variables, it becomes testable. We apply our theory to a large information-
based industry, actively managed equity mutual funds, and study its investment choices
and returns. Consistent with the theory, which predicts cyclical changes in attention
allocation, we find that in recessions, funds’ portfolios (1) covary more with aggregate
payoff-relevant information, (2) exhibit more cross-sectional dispersion, and (3) gener-
ate higher returns. The results suggest that some, but not all, fund managers process
information in a value-maximizing way for their clients and that these skilled managers
outperform others.
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“What information consumes is rather obvious: It consumes the attention of its re-
cipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention, and a need
to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources
that might consume it.” Simon (1971)
Most decision makers are faced with an abundance of available information and must choose
how to allocate their limited attention. Recent work has shown that introducing attention
constraints into decision problems can help explain observed price-setting, consumption, and
investment patterns.1 Unfortunately, the invisibility of information precludes direct testing
of whether agents actually allocate their attention in a value-maximizing way. To surmount
this obstacle, we develop a model of investment that uses an observable variable – the state
of the business cycle – to predict attention allocation. Attention, in turn, predicts aggre-
gate investment patterns. Because the theory begins and ends with observable variables, it
becomes testable. To carry out these tests, we use data on actively managed equity mutual
funds. A wealth of detailed data on portfolio holdings and returns makes this industry an
ideal setting in which to test the rationality of attention allocation.
A better understanding of attention allocation sheds new light on a central question in
the financial intermediation literature: Do investment managers add value for their clients?
What makes this an important question is that a large and growing fraction of individual
investors delegate their portfolio management to professional investment managers.2 This
intermediation occurs despite a significant body of evidence that finds that actively man-
aged portfolios tend to underperform passive investment strategies, on average, net of fees,
and after controlling for differences in systematic risk exposure.3 This evidence of negative
average “alpha” has led many to conclude that investment managers have no skill. By devel-
1See, for example, Sims (2003) on consumption, Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2009a, 2009b) on price-
setting and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009, 2010) on investment. Klenow and Willis (2007) and
Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinber (2006) test whether price-setting dynamics and experimental out-
comes are consistent with inattention theories. A related investment literature on information choice includes
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Verrecchia (1982), Admati (1985), Peress (2004, 2009), Amador and Weill
(2008), and Veldkamp (2006). While in rational inattention models, agents typically choose the precision of
their beliefs, Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker (2007) solve a portfolio problem in which investors choose
the mean of their beliefs. In models of inattentiveness, e.g. Mankiw and Reis (2002) or Gabaix and Laibson
(2002), agents update infrequently, but do not choose to to pay more attention to some risks than others.
2In 1980, 48% of U.S. equity was directly held by individuals – as opposed to being held through inter-
mediaries; by 2007 that fraction has been down to 21.5%. See French (2008), Table 1. At the end of 2008,
$9.6 trillion was invested with such intermediaries in the U.S. Of all investment in domestic equity mutual
funds, about 85% is actively managed (2009 Investment Company Factbook). A related theoretical literature
studies delegated portfolio management; e.g., Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), Cuoco and Kaniel (2007),
Vayanos and Woolley (2008), and Chien, Cole, and Lustig (2009).
3Among many others, see Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995), Gruber (1996), Fama and French (2008).
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oping a theory of managers’ information and investment choices and finding evidence for its
predictions in the mutual fund industry data, we conclude that the data are consistent with
a world in which a small fraction of investment managers have skill.4 However, the model is
also consistent with the empirical literature’s finding that skill is hard to detect, on average.
The model identifies recessions as times when information choices lead to investment choices
that are more revealing of skill.
We argue that recessions and expansions imply different optimal attention allocation
strategies for skilled investment managers. Different learning strategies, in turn, prompt
different investment strategies, causing the differential performance in recessions and expan-
sions. Specifically, we build a general equilibrium model in which a fraction of investment
managers have skill, meaning that they can acquire and process informative signals about
the future values of risky assets. These skilled managers can observe a fixed number of
signals and choose what fraction of those signals will contain aggregate versus stock-specific
information. We think of aggregate signals as macroeconomic data that affect future cash
flows of all firms, and of stock-specific signals as firm-level data that forecast the part of
firms’ future cash flows that is independent of the aggregate shocks. Based on their signals,
skilled managers form portfolios, choosing larger portfolio weights for assets that are more
likely to have high returns.
The model’s predictions fall into three categories. The first one relates to attention
allocation. As in most learning problems, risks that are large in scale and high in volatility
are more valuable to learn about. In our model, aggregate shocks are large in scale, because
many asset returns are affected by them, but they have low volatility. Stock-specific shocks
are smaller in scale but have higher volatility. As in the data, aggregate shocks are more
volatile in recessions, relative to stock-specific shocks.5 The increased volatility of aggregate
shocks makes it optimal to devote relatively more attention to aggregate shocks in recessions
and stock-specific shocks in expansions.
The second category of predictions pertains to portfolio dispersion and helps to distin-
guish our theory from a non-informational one. In recessions, when aggregate shocks to asset
4The finding that some managers have skill is consistent with a number of recent papers in the empirical
mutual fund literature, e.g., Cohen, Coval, and Pa´stor (2005), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005, 2008),
Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), Koijen (2008), Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2009), Huang, Sialm, and
Zhang (2009).
5We show below that the idiosyncratic risk in stock returns, averaged across stocks, does not vary signif-
icantly over the business cycle. In contrast, the aggregate risk averaged across stocks is almost forty percent
higher in recessions. Consistent with this fact, Ang and Chen (2002), Ribeiro and Veronesi (2002), and
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) document that stocks exhibit more comovement in recessions.
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payoffs are larger in magnitude, asset payoffs exhibit more comovement. Thus, any portfolio
strategies that put (exogenously) fixed weights on assets would have returns that also co-
move more in recessions. In contrast, when investment managers learn about asset payoffs
and manage their portfolios according to what they learn, recessionary fund returns comove
less. The reason is that when aggregate shocks become more volatile, and less predictable,
managers who learn about aggregate shocks end up having more heterogeneous beliefs. They
put less weight on their common prior beliefs, which have less predictive power, and more
weight on their heterogeneous signals. More heterogeneous beliefs in recessions generates
more heterogeneous investment strategies and fund returns as well.
Third, the model predicts time variation in fund performance. The average fund can only
outperform the market if there are other, non-fund investors who underperform. Therefore,
the model also includes unskilled non-fund investors. Due to their lack of skill, they reside
mostly in the left tail of the return distribution. When return dispersion rises, in recessions,
left-tail investors underperform by more and the average fund’s outperformance rises.
We test the model’s three main predictions on the universe of actively managed U.S.
mutual funds. To detect evidence of cyclical changes in attention, we estimate the covariance
of each fund’s portfolio holdings with the aggregate payoff shock, proxied by innovations in
industrial production growth. We call this covariance reliance on aggregate information
(RAI). RAI indicates a manager’s ability to time the market by increasing (decreasing) her
portfolio positions in anticipation of good (bad) macroeconomic news. We find that the
average RAI across funds is higher in recessions. We also calculate the covariance of a fund’s
portfolio holdings with asset-specific shocks, proxied by innovations in earnings. We call this
variable reliance on stock-specific information (RSI). RSI measures managers’ ability to pick
stocks that subsequently experience unexpectedly high earnings. We find that RSI is higher
in expansions.
Second, we test for cyclical changes in portfolio dispersion. In recessions, we find a higher
portfolio concentration, measured as the sum of squared deviations of portfolio weights from
those of the market portfolio. When funds hold portfolios that differ more from the market,
which is the average portfolio, they are also holding portfolios that differ more from one
another. Also consistent with the concentration hypothesis, we find higher idiosyncratic risk
in fund returns in recessions. The increased dispersion additionally appears in fund returns,
alphas, and betas. All these are predictions of our theory. Figure 1 shows a 30% increase of
the cross-sectional standard deviation of fund alphas in recessions for our mutual fund data.
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Third, we document fund outperformance in recessions.6 Risk-adjusted excess fund re-
turns (alphas) are around 1.8 to 2.4% per year higher in recessions, depending on the specifi-
cation. Gross alphas (before fees) are not statistically different from zero in expansions, but
they are positive in recessions. Net alphas (after fees) are negative in expansions and pos-
itive in recessions. These cyclical differences are statistically and economically significant.
Indeed, Figure 2 shows that, over the period 1980-2005, actively managed mutual funds
have earned 2.1% risk-adjusted excess returns (alphas) per year in recessions but only 0.3%
in expansions. What remains for investors (net of fees) is 1.0% in recessions and -0.9% in
expansions; the difference of 1.9% per year is both economically and statistically significant.
Because our theory tells us how skilled managers should invest, it suggests how to con-
struct metrics that could help us identify skilled managers. To show that skilled managers
exist, we select the top 25 percent of funds in terms of their stock-picking ability in ex-
pansions and show that the same group has significant market-timing ability in recessions;
the other funds show no such market-timing ability.7 Furthermore, these funds have higher
unconditional returns. They tend to manage smaller, more active funds. By matching fund-
level to manager-level data, we find that these skilled managers are more likely to attract new
money flows and are more likely to depart later in their careers to hedge funds. Presumably,
both are market-based reflections of their ability. Finally, we construct a skill index based
on observables and show that it is persistent and that it predicts future performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out our model. After
describing the setup, we characterize the optimal information and investment choices of
skilled and unskilled investors. We show how equilibrium asset prices are formed. We derive
theoretical predictions for funds’ attention allocation, portfolio dispersion, and performance.
Section 2 contains the empirical analysis for actively managed mutual funds and tests the
model’s predictions. Section 3 uses the model’s insights to identify a group of skilled mutual
funds in the data. Section 4 briefly discusses alternative explanations. While there might be
other potential alternative explanations for each of the three main predictions of the model,
none of the alternatives can account for all three predictions jointly.
6Kosowski (2006), Lynch and Wachter (2007), and Glode (2008) also document such evidence, but their
focus is solely on performance.
7This is quite different from the typical approach in the literature, which has studied stock picking and
market timing in isolation, and unconditional on the state of the economy. The consensus view from that
literature is that there is some evidence for stock-picking ability (on average over time and across managers),
but no evidence for market timing (e.g., Graham and Harvey (1996), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1997), Wermers (2000), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), and Breon-Drish and Sagi (2008)).
4
1 Model
We develop a stylized model whose purpose is to understand the optimal attention allocation
of investment managers, its implications for asset holdings and for equilibrium asset prices.
1.1 Setup
We consider a three-period static model. At time 1, skilled investment managers choose how
to allocate their attention across aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. At time 2, all investors
choose their portfolios of risky and riskless assets. At time 3, asset payoffs and utility are
realized. Since this is a static model, the investment world is either in the recession (R) or
in the expansion state (E).8 Our main model holds each manager’s total attention fixed and
studies its allocation in recessions and expansions. In Section 1.7, we allow a manager to
choose how much capacity for attention to acquire.
Assets The model features three assets. Assets 1 and 2 have random payoffs f with
respective loadings b1, b2 on an aggregate shock a, and face an idiosyncratic shock s1, s2.
The third asset, c, is a composite asset. Its payoff has no idiosyncratic shock and a loading
of one on the aggregate shock. We use this composite asset as a stand-in for all other assets
to avoid the curse of dimensionality in the optimal attention allocation problem. Formally,
fi = µi + bia+ si, i ∈ {1, 2}
fc = µc + a
where the shocks a ∼ N(0, σa) and si ∼ N(0, σi), for i ∈ {1, 2}. At time 1, the distribution of
payoffs is common knowledge; all investors have common priors about payoffs f ∼ N(µ,Σ).
Let E1, V1 denote expectations and variances conditioned on this information. Specifically,
E1[fi] = µi. The prior covariance matrix of the payoffs, Σ, has the following entries: Σii =
8We do not consider transitions between recessions and expansions, although such an extension would be
trivial in our setting because assets are short lived and their payoffs are realized and known to all investors
at the end of each period. Thus, a dynamic model simply amounts to a succession of static models that are
either in the expansion or in the recession state.
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b2iσa + σi and Σij = bibjσa. In matrix notation:
Σ = bb′σa +
 σ1 0 00 σ2 0
0 0 0

where the vector b is defined as b = [b1 b2 1]
′. In addition to the three risky assets, there
exists a risk-free asset that pays a gross return, r.
We model recessions as periods with higher aggregate risk, that is, the prior variance of the
aggregate shock in recessions is higher than the one in expansions: σa(R) > σa(E). Section
2.2 justifies this assumption by showing that aggregate risk of stocks increases substantially
in recessions while idiosyncratic risk does not.
Investors We consider a continuum of atomless investors. In the model, the only ex-ante
difference between investors is that a fraction χ of them have skill, meaning that they can
choose to observe a set of informative signals about the payoff shocks a or si. We describe
this signal choice problem below. The remaining unskilled investors observe no information
other than their prior beliefs.
Some of the unskilled investors are investment managers. As in reality, there are also
non-fund investors, all of whom we assume are unskilled.9 The reason for modeling non-
fund investors is that without them, the sum of all funds’ holdings would have to equal the
market (market clearing) and therefore, the average fund return would have to equal the
market return. There could be no excess return in expansions or recessions.
Bayesian Updating At time 2, each skilled investment manager observes signal realiza-
tions. Signals are random draws from a distribution that is centered around the true payoff
shock, with a variance equal to the inverse of the signal precision that was chosen at time
1. Thus, skilled manager j’s signals are ηaj = a + eaj, η1j = s1 + e1j, and η2j = s2 + e2j,
where eaj ∼ N(0, τaj), e1j ∼ N(0, τ1j), and e2j ∼ N(0, τ2j) are independent of each other
and across fund managers. Managers combine signal realizations with priors to update their
beliefs, using Bayes’ law. Asset prices are not a separate source of information. Of course,
managers can observe asset prices and infer asset-payoff relevant information from them. But
making that inference requires allocating attention to prices, in order to process in the infor-
9For our results, it is sufficient that the fraction of them that are unskilled is higher than for the investment
managers (funds).
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mation they contain. In other words, learning from prices requires using capacity. Whatever
information managers choose to infer from prices is already included in the signals.
Since the resulting posterior beliefs (conditional on time-2 information) are such that
payoffs are normally distributed, they can be fully described by posterior means, (aˆj, sˆij),
and variances, (σˆaj, σˆij). More precisely, posterior precisions are the sum of prior and signal
precisions: σˆ−1aj = σ
−1
a + τ
−1
aj and σˆ
−1
ij = σ
−1
i + τ
−1
ij . The posterior means of the idiosyncratic
shocks, sˆij, are a precision-weighted linear combination of the prior belief that si = 0 and
the signal ηi: sˆij = τ
−1
1j η1j/(τ
−1
ij + σ
−1
i ). Simplifying yields sˆij = (1 − σˆijσ−1i )ηij and aˆj =
(1−σˆajσ−1a )ηaj. Next, we convert posterior beliefs about the underlying shocks into posterior
beliefs about the asset payoffs. Let Σˆj be the posterior variance-covariance matrix of payoffs
f :
Σˆj = bb
′σˆaj +
 σˆ1j 0 00 σˆ2j 0
0 0 0

Likewise, let µˆj be the vector of posterior expected payoffs:
µˆj = [µ1 + b1aˆj + sˆ1j, µ2 + b2aˆj + sˆ2j, µc + aˆj]
′ (1)
For any unskilled manager or investor: µˆj = µ and Σˆj = Σ.
Portfolio Choice Problem We solve this model by backward induction. We first solve
for the optimal portfolio at time 2 and substitute in that solution into the time-1 optimal
attention allocation problem.
Investors are each endowed with initial wealth,W0. They have mean-variance preferences
over time-3 wealth, with a risk aversion coefficient ρ. Let E2 and V2 denote expectations
and variances conditioned on all information known at time 2. Thus, investor j chooses qj
to maximize time-2 expected utility, U2j:
U2j = ρE2[Wj]− ρ
2
2
V2[Wj] (2)
subject to the budget constraint:
Wj = rW0 + q
′
j(f − pr) (3)
After having received the signals and having observed the prices of the risky assets, p, the
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investment manager chooses risky asset holdings, qj, where p and qj are 3-by-1 vectors.
Asset Prices Equilibrium asset prices are determined by market clearing:∫
qjdj = x¯+ x, (4)
where the left-hand side of the equation is the vector of aggregate demand and the right-
hand side is the vector of aggregate supply. As in the standard noisy rational expectations
equilibrium model, the asset supply is random to prevent the price from fully revealing the
information of informed investors. We denote the 3× 1 noisy asset supply vector by x¯ + x,
with a random component x ∼ N(0, σxI).
Attention Allocation Problem At time 1, a skilled investment manager j chooses the
precisions of signals about the payoff-relevant shocks a, s1, or s2 that she will receive at
time 2. We denote these signal precisions by τ−1aj , τ
−1
1j , and τ
−1
2j , respectively. These choices
maximize time-1 expected utility, U1j, over the fund’s terminal wealth:
U1j = E1
[
ρE2[Wj]− ρ
2
2
V2[Wj]
]
, (5)
subject to two constraints.
The first constraint is the information capacity constraint. It states that the sum of the
signal precisions must not exceed the information capacity:
τ−11j + τ
−1
2j + τ
−1
aj ≤ K. (6)
Unskilled investors have no information capacity K = 0. In Bayesian updating with normal
variables, observing one signal with precision τ−1 or two signals, each with precision τ−1/2,
is equivalent. Therefore, one interpretation of the capacity constraint is that it allows the
manager to observe N signal draws, each with precision K/N , for large N . The investment
manager then chooses how many of those N signals will be about each shock.
The second constraint is the no-forgetting constraint, which ensures that the chosen
precisions are non-negative:
τ−11j ≥ 0 τ−12j ≥ 0 τ−1aj ≥ 0. (7)
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It prevents the manager from erasing any prior information, to make room to gather new
information about another shock.
1.2 Model Solution
Substituting the budget constraint (3) into the objective function (2) and taking the first-
order condition with respect to qj reveals that optimal holdings are increasing in the investor’s
risk tolerance, precision of beliefs, and expected return on the assets:
qj =
1
ρ
Σˆ−1j (µˆj − pr). (8)
Since uninformed managers and other investors have identical beliefs, µˆj = µ and Σˆj = Σ,
they hold identical portfolios ρ−1Σ−1(µ− pr).
Appendix S.1 utilizes the market-clearing condition (4) to prove that equilibrium asset
prices are linear in payoffs and supply shocks, and to derive expressions for the coefficients
A, B, and C in the following proposition:10
Proposition 1. p = 1
r
(A+Bf + Cx)
Substituting optimal risky asset holdings from equation (8) into the first-period objective
(5) yields: U1j =
1
2
E1
[
(µˆj − pr)Σˆ−1j (µˆj − pr)
]
. Because asset prices are linear functions of
normally distributed payoffs and asset supplies, expected excess returns, µˆj−pr, are normally
distributed as well. Therefore, (µˆj−pr)Σˆ−1j (µˆj−pr) is a non-central χ2-distributed variable,
with mean11
U1j =
1
2
trace(Σˆ−1j V1[µˆj − pr]) +
1
2
E1[µˆj − pr]′Σˆ−1j E1[µˆj − pr]. (9)
1.3 Bridging The Gap Between Model and Data
The following three sections explain the model’s three key predictions: attention allocation,
dispersion in investors’ portfolios, and average performance. For each prediction, we state a
hypothesis and explain how to test it. But the payoffs and quantities that have analytical
10References denoted S are in the paper’s separate appendix, available from the authors’ websites or at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~lveldkam/pdfs/mfund_KVNV_appdx.pdf
11If z ∼ N(E[z], V ar[z]), then E[z′z] = trace(V ar[z]) + E[z]′E[z], where trace is the matrix trace (the
sum of its diagonal elements). Setting z = Σˆ−1/2j (µˆj − pr) delivers the result. Appendix S.1.2 contains the
expressions for E1[µˆj − pr] and V1[µˆj − pr].
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expressions in a CARA-normal model do not correspond neatly to the returns and portfolio
weights that are commonly measured in the data. To bridge this gap, we introduce empirical
measures of attention, dispersion, and performance. These standard definitions of returns
and portfolio weights have no known moment-generating functions in our model. For exam-
ple, the asset return is a ratio of normally distributed variables. Therefore, Appendix S.2
uses a numerical example to demonstrate that the empirical and theoretical measures have
the same comparative statics.
Specifically, our empirical measures use conventional definitions of asset returns, portfolio
returns, and portfolio weights. Risky asset returns are defined as Ri ≡ fi
pi
−1, for i ∈ {1, 2, c},
while the risk-free asset return is R0 ≡ 1+r
1
−1 = r. We define the market return as the value-
weighted average of the individual asset returns: Rm ≡ ∑3i=1wmi Ri, where wmi ≡ piqji∑3
i=1 piq
j
i
.
Likewise, a fund j’s return is Rj ≡∑3i=0wjiRi, where wji ≡ piqji∑3
i=0 piq
j
i
. It follows that end-of-
period wealth (assets under management) equals beginning-of-period wealth times the fund
return: W j = W j0 (1 +R
j).
1.4 Hypothesis 1: Attention Allocation
Each skilled manager (K > 0) solves for the choice of signal precisions τ−1aj ≥ 0 and τ−11j ≥ 0
that maximize her time-1 expected utility (9). The choice of signal precision τ−12j ≥ 0 is
implied by the capacity constraint (6). A robust prediction of our model is that it becomes
relatively more valuable to learn about the aggregate shock, a, when the prior aggregate
variance increases, that is, in recessions.
Proposition 2. If the aggregate shock variance is not too high (σa ≤ 1), then the marginal
value of additional capacity K devoted to learning about the aggregate shock is increasing in
the aggregate shock variance: ∂2U/∂K∂σa > 0.
The proofs of this and all further Propositions are in Appendix S.1. Intuitively, in most
learning problems, investors prefer to learn about large shocks that are an important com-
ponent of the overall asset supply, and volatile shocks that have high prior payoff variance.
Aggregate shocks are larger in scale, but are less volatile than stock-specific shocks. Re-
cessions are times when aggregate volatility increases, which makes aggregate shocks more
valuable to learn about. As a result, in recessions, skilled investment managers allocate
a relatively larger fraction of their attention to learning about the aggregate shock. The
converse is true in expansions. The parameter restriction σa < 1, is a sufficient, but not nec-
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essary condition. Of the seven terms in expected utility, six can be signed without parameter
restrictions and one requires this restriction to be positive.
Appendix S.2 presents a detailed numerical example in which parameters are chosen to
match the observed volatilities of the aggregate and individual stock returns in expansions
and recessions. For our benchmark parameter values, all skilled managers exclusively allocate
attention to idiosyncratic shocks in expansions. In contrast, the bulk of skilled managers
learn about the aggregate shock in recessions (87%, with the remaining 13% equally split
between shocks 1 and 2). Thus, managers may want to reallocate their attention over the
business cycle.
We have verified that similarly large swings in attention allocation occur for a wide range
of parameters. The result breaks down when assets become very asymmetric so that one
learning decision is dominant in recessions and expansions. For example, if the average
supply of the composite asset, x¯c, is too large relative to the supply of the individual asset
supplies, x¯1 and x¯2, the aggregate shock will be so valuable to learn about that all skilled
managers will want to learn about it all the time. Similarly, if the aggregate volatility, σa,
is too low, then nobody ever wants to learn about the aggregate shock.
Investors’ optimal attention allocation decisions are reflected in their portfolio holdings.
In recessions, skilled investors predominantly allocate attention to the aggregate payoff shock,
a. They use the information they observe to form a portfolio that covaries with a. In times
when they learn that a will be high, they hold more risky assets whose returns are increasing
in a. This positive covariance can be seen from equation (8) in which q is increasing in µˆj
and from equation (1) in which µˆj is increasing in aˆj, which is further increasing in a. The
positive covariances between the aggregate shock and funds’ portfolio holdings in recessions,
on the one hand, and between idiosyncratic shocks and the portfolio holdings in expansions,
on the other hand, directly follow from optimal attention allocation decisions switching over
the business cycle. As such, these covariances are the key moments that enable us to test
the attention allocation predictions of the model.
We define a fund’s reliance on aggregate information, RAI, as the covariance between its
portfolio weights in deviation from the market portfolio weights, wji −wmi , and the aggregate
payoff shock, a:
RAIjt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(wjit − wmit )(at+1), (10)
where N is the number of individual assets. The subscript t on the portfolio weights and the
subscript t + 1 on the aggregate shock signify that the aggregate shock is unknown at the
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time of portfolio formation. In our static model, time t is period 2 and time t+ 1 is period
3. Relative to the market, a fund with a high RAI overweighs assets that have high (low)
sensitivity to the aggregate shock in anticipation of a positive (negative) aggregate shock
realization and underweighs assets with a low (high) sensitivity.
RAI is closely related to measures of market-timing ability. Timing measures how a
fund’s holdings of each asset, relative the market, covary with the systematic component of
the stock return:
Timingjt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(wjit − wmit )(βit+1Rmt+1), (11)
where βi measures the covariance of asset i’s return, R
i, with the market return, Rm, divided
by the variance of the market return. The object βiR
m measures the systematic component
of returns of asset i. The time subscripts indicate that the systematic component of the
return is unknown at the time of portfolio formation. Before the market return rises, a fund
with a high Timing ability overweighs assets that have high beta. Likewise, it underweighs
assets with a high beta in anticipation of a market decline.
To confirm that RAI and Timing accurately represent the model’s prediction that skilled
investors allocate more attention to the aggregate state in recessions, we resort to a numer-
ical simulation. Appendix S.2 details the procedure and the construction of the empirical
measures. For brevity, we only discuss the comparative statics in the main text. The simu-
lation results show that RAI and Timing are higher for skilled investors in recessions than
they are in expansions. Because of market clearing, not all investors can time the market.
Unskilled investors have negative timing ability in recessions. When the aggregate state a is
low, most skilled investors sell, pushing down asset prices, p, and making prior expected re-
turns, (µ− pr), high. Equation (8) shows that uninformed investors’ asset holdings increase
in (µ − pr). Thus, their holdings covary negatively with aggregate payoffs, making their
RAI and Timing measures negative. Since no investors learn about the aggregate shock in
expansions, RAI and Timing are close to zero for both skilled and unskilled. When averaged
over all funds (including both skilled and unskilled funds but excluding non-fund investors),
we find that RAI and Timing are higher in recessions than in expansions.
When skilled investment managers allocate attention to stock-specific payoff shocks, si,
information about si allows them to choose portfolios that covary with si. We define re-
liance on stock-specific information, RSI, which measures the covariance of a fund’s portfolio
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weights of each stock, relative to the market, with the stock-specific shock, si:
RSIjt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(wjit − wmit )(sit+1) (12)
How well the manager can choose portfolio weights in anticipation of future asset-specific
payoff shocks is closely linked to her stock-picking ability. Pickingjt measures how a fund’s
holdings of each stock, relative to the market, covary with the idiosyncratic component of
the stock return:
Pickingjt =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(wjit − wmit )(Rit+1 − βiRmt+1) (13)
A fund with a high Picking ability overweighs assets that have subsequently high idiosyn-
cratic returns and underweighs assets with low subsequent idiosyncratic returns. In our
simulation, we find that skilled funds have positive RSI and Picking ability in expansions,
when they allocate their attention to stock-specific information. Unskilled investors have
negative Picking in expansions for the same reason that they have negative Timing in re-
cessions: Price fluctuations induce them to buy when returns are low and sell when returns
are high. Across all funds, the model predicts lower RSI and Picking in recessions.
1.5 Hypothesis 2: Dispersion
A second, more fundamental question is whether investment managers are processing infor-
mation at all. One prediction that speaks directly to that question is portfolio dispersion.
In recessions, as aggregate shocks become more volatile, the idiosyncratic shocks to assets’
payoffs account for less of the variation, and the comovement in stock payoffs rises. Since
asset payoffs comove more, the payoffs to all investment strategies that put fixed weights on
assets should also comove more.
When investment managers are processing information, this prediction is reversed. To
see why, consider the Bayesian updating formula for the posterior mean of asset payoffs. It
is a weighted average of the prior mean µ and the signals η|f ∼ N(f,Ση), where each is
weighted by their relative precision:
E[f |η] = (Σ−1 + Σ−1η )−1 (Σ−1µ+ Σ−1η η) (14)
In recessions, when the variance of the aggregate shock σa rises, the prior beliefs about asset
payoffs are more uncertain, Σ rises, and Σ−1 falls. This makes the weight on prior beliefs
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µ decrease and the weight on the signal η increase. The prior µ is common across agents,
while the signal η is heterogeneous. When agents weight their heterogeneous signals more,
their resulting posterior beliefs become more heterogeneous. More disagreement about what
asset payoffs will be results in more heterogeneous portfolios and portfolio returns.
Thus, the model’s second prediction is that in recessions, the cross-sectional dispersion in
funds’ investment strategies and returns rises. The following Proposition shows that funds’
portfolio returns, q′j(f − pr), display higher cross-sectional dispersion when aggregate risk is
higher, in recessions.
Proposition 3. If the average manager has sufficiently low capacity, χK < σ−1a , then an
increase in aggregate risk, σa, increases the dispersion of funds’ portfolios E[(qj− q¯)′(qj− q¯)′],
and their portfolio returns E[((qj − q¯)′(f − pr))2], where q¯ ≡
∫
qjdj.
As before, the parameter restriction is sufficient, but not necessary.
To connect our model to the data, we use several measures of portfolio dispersion, com-
monly used in the empirical literature. The first one is the sum of squared deviations of fund
j’s portfolio weight in asset i at time t from the average fund’s portfolio weight in asset i at
time t, summed over all assets:
Concentrationjt =
N∑
i=1
(
wjit − wmit
)2
(15)
We label this measure Concentration because, as any Herfindahl index, it is a measure
of portfolio concentration. Cross-sectional dispersion and concentration are two sides of
the same coin. Because markets must clear, funds cannot all hold concentrated portfolios
without dispersion across their portfolios. Our numerical example shows that Concentration
is higher for all funds in recessions than it is in expansions. This increase is driven entirely
by the informed; the uninformed are all holding the exact same portfolio because of common
prior beliefs.
Because more concentrated portfolios are less diversified, the model predicts that a skilled
fund’s returns contain higher idiosyncratic risk in recessions.12 We define idiosyncratic port-
12The terminology idiosyncratic risk is slightly misleading in our context. In fact, the portfolio is not
riskier as skilled managers obtain information which reduces risk. They optimally trade off the benefits
from information against the costs of a reduction in diversification. The standard CAPM equation does not
capture this tradeoff because it does not condition on what the manager knows.
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folio risk as the residual standard deviation, σjε, from a CAPM regression for fund j:
Rjt = α
j + βjRmt + σ
j
εε
j
t (16)
In the simulation, skilled funds take on more idiosyncratic risk than the unskilled ones, and
more so in recessions than in expansions. As a result, idiosyncratic risk, our second measure
of portfolio dispersion, is higher in recessions than it is in expansions for all funds.
The higher dispersion across funds’ portfolio strategies translates into a higher cross-
sectional dispersion in fund returns. We look at dispersion in the funds’ abnormal returns,
Rj − Rm, CAPM alphas, αj from equation (16), and CAPM betas, βj. To facilitate com-
parison with the data, we define the dispersion of variable X as the average over funds of
|Xj − X¯|. The notation X¯ denotes the equally weighted cross-sectional average across all
investment managers (excluding the other investors). Our numerical results show a higher
dispersion of fund abnormal returns, alphas, and betas.
1.6 Hypothesis 3: Performance
The third prediction of the model is that the average performance of investment managers
is higher in recessions than it is in expansions. The following Proposition shows that skilled
funds’ abnormal portfolio returns, defined as their portfolio return, q′j(f − pr), minus the
market return, q¯′(f − pr), are higher when aggregate risk is higher, that is, in recessions.
Proposition 4. If some managers are uninformed, χ < 1, but all informed managers learn
about aggregate risk, and the average manager has sufficiently low capacity, χK < σ−1a ,
then an increase in aggregate risk, σa, increases the expected profit of an informed fund,
E[(qj − q¯)′(f − pr)], where q¯ ≡
∫
qjdj.
Because asset payoffs are more uncertain, recessions are times when information is more
valuable. Therefore, the advantage of the skilled over the unskilled increases in recessions.
This informational advantage generates higher (risk-adjusted) excess returns for informed
managers. In equilibrium, market clearing dictates that alphas average to zero across all
investors. However, because our data only include mutual funds, our model calculations
similarly exclude non-fund investors. Since investment managers are skilled or unskilled,
while other investors are only unskilled, an increase in the skill premium implies that the
average manager’s alpha rises in recessions. The same argument holds for the abnormal
return.
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Our numerical simulations confirm that abnormal returns and alphas, defined as in the
empirical literature, and averaged over all funds, are higher in recessions than in expansions.
Skilled investment managers have positive excess returns, while the uninformed ones have
negative excess returns. Aggregating across skilled and unskilled funds results in higher
average alphas in recessions, the third main prediction of the model.
1.7 Endogenous Capacity Choice
So far, we have assumed that skilled investment managers choose how to allocate a fixed
information-processing capacity, K. We now extend the model to allow for skilled managers
to add capacity at a cost C (K).13 We draw three main conclusions. First, the proofs of
Propositions 2-4 hold for any chosen level of capacity K, below an upper bound, no mat-
ter the functional form of C. Endogenous capacity only has quantitative, not qualitative
implications. Second, because the marginal utility of learning about the aggregate shock is
increasing in its prior variance (Proposition 2), skilled managers choose to acquire higher ca-
pacity in recessions. This extensive-margin effect amplifies our benchmark intensive-margin
results. Third, the degree of amplification depends on the convexity of the cost function,
C (K). The convexity determines how elastic equilibrium capacity choice is to the cyclical
changes in the marginal benefit of learning. Appendix S.2.4 discusses numerical simulation
results from the endogenous-K model; they are similar to our benchmark results.
2 Evidence from Equity Mutual Funds
Our model studies attention allocation over the business cycle, and its consequences for
investors’ strategies. We now turn to a specific set of investment managers, mutual fund
managers, to test the predictions of the model. The richness of the data makes the mutual
fund industry a great laboratory for this test. In principle, similar tests could be conducted
for hedge funds, other professional investment managers, or even individual investors.
2.1 Data
Our sample builds upon several data sets. We begin with the Center for Research on Security
Prices (CRSP) survivorship bias-free mutual fund database. The CRSP database provides
13We model this cost as a utility penalty, akin to the disutility from labor in business cycle models. Since
there are no wealth effects in our setting, it would be equivalent to modeling a cost of capacity through the
budget constraint. For a richer treatment of information production modeling, see Veldkamp (2006).
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comprehensive information about fund returns and a host of other fund characteristics, such
as size (total net assets), age, expense ratio, turnover, and load. Given the nature of our
tests and data availability, we focus on actively managed open-end U.S. equity mutual funds.
We further merge the CRSP data with fund holdings data from Thomson Financial. The
total number of funds in our merged sample is 3,477.
In addition, for some of our exercises, we map funds to the names of their managers using
information from CRSP, Morningstar, Nelson’ Directory of Investment Managers, Zoominfo,
and Zabasearch. This mapping results in a sample with 4,267 managers. We also use the
CRSP/Compustat stock-level database, which is a source of information on individual stocks’
return, market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, momentum, liquidity, and standardized
unexpected earnings (SUE). We use changes in monthly industrial production as a proxy for
aggregate shocks. Industrial production is seasonally adjusted; the data are from the Federal
Reserve Statistical Release.
Finally, we measure recessions using the definition of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) business cycle dating committee. The start of the recession is the peak of
economic activity and its end is the trough. Our aggregate sample spans 312 months of data
from January 1980 until December 2005, among which 38 are NBER recession months (12%).
In robustness analysis, we consider several alternative recession indicators (see Section 2.6).
2.2 Recessions Are Periods of Higher Aggregate Risk
Before testing our main hypotheses, we present empirical evidence for the main assumption
in our model: Recessions are periods in which individual stocks contain more aggregate risk.
Table 1 shows that an average stock’s aggregate risk increases substantially in recessions
whereas the change in idiosyncratic risk is not statistically different from zero. The table
uses monthly returns for all stocks in the CRSP universe. For each stock and each month, we
estimate a CAPM equation based on a twelve-month rolling-window regression, delivering
the stock’s beta, βit , and its residual standard deviation, σ
i
εt. We define the aggregate risk of
stock i in month t as |βitσmt | and its idiosyncratic risk as σiεt, where σmt is formed monthly as
the realized volatility from daily return observations. Panel A reports the results from a time-
series regression of the aggregate risk averaged across stocks (Columns 1 and 2) and of the
idiosyncratic risk averaged across stocks (Columns 3 and 4) on the NBER recession indicator
variable.14 The aggregate risk is one-third higher in recessions than it is in expansions (0.69
14The reported results are for equally weighted averages. Unreported results confirm that value-weighted
averaging across stocks delivers the same conclusion.
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versus 0.48), an economically and statistically significant difference. In contrast, the stock’s
idiosyncratic risk is essentially identical in expansions and in recessions. The results are
similar whether one controls for other aggregate risk factors (Columns 2 and 4) or not
(Columns 1 and 3). Panel B reports estimates from panel regressions of a stock’s aggregate
risk (Columns 1 and 2) or idiosyncratic risk (Columns 3 and 4) on the recession indicator
variable, Recession, and additional stock-specific control variables including size, book-to-
market ratio, and leverage. The panel results confirm the time-series findings.
2.3 Testing Hypothesis 1: Attention Allocation
We begin by testing the first and most direct prediction of our model, that skilled investment
managers reallocate their attention over the business cycle. Learning about the aggregate
payoff shock in recessions makes managers choose portfolio holdings that covary more with
the aggregate shock. Conversely, in expansions their holdings covary more with stock-specific
information. To this end, we estimate the following regression model:
Attentionjt = a0 + a1Recessiont + a2X
j
t + ²
j
t , (17)
where Attentionjt denotes a generic attention variable, observed at month t for fund j.
Recessiont is an indicator variable equal to one if the economy in month t is in recession, as
defined by the NBER, and zero otherwise. X is a vector of fund-specific control variables,
including the fund age (natural logarithm of age in years since inception, log(Age)), the
fund size (natural logarithm of total net assets under management in millions of dollars,
log(TNA)), the average fund expense ratio (in percent per year, Expenses), the turnover
rate (in percent per year, Turnover), the percentage flow of new funds (defined as the ratio
of TNAjt − TNAjt−1(1 + Rjt ) to TNAjt−1, Flow), and the fund load (the sum of front-end
and back-end loads, additional fees charged to the customers to cover marketing and other
expenses, Load). Also included are the fund style characteristics along the size, value, and
momentum dimensions.15 To mitigate the impact of outliers on our estimates, we winsorize
15The size style of a fund is the value-weighted score of its stock holdings’ percentile scores calculated
with respect to their market capitalizations (1 denotes the smallest size percentile; 100 denotes the largest
size percentile). The value style is the value-weighted score of its stock holdings’ percentile scores calculated
with respect to their book-to-market ratios (1 denotes the smallest B/M percentile; 100 denotes the largest
B/M percentile). The momentum style is the value-weighted score of a fund’s stock holdings’ percentile
scores calculated with respect to their past twelve-month returns (1 denotes the smallest return percentile;
100 denotes the largest return percentile). These style measures are similar in spirit to those defined in
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) and Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2009).
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Flow and Turnover at the 1% level.
We estimate this and most of our subsequent regression specifications using pooled (panel)
regression and calculating standard errors by clustering at the fund and time dimensions.
This approach addresses the concern that the errors, conditional on independent variables,
might be correlated within fund and time dimensions (e.g., Moulton (1986) and Thompson
(2009)). Addressing this concern is especially important in our context since our variable of
interest, Recession, is constant across all fund observations in a given time period. Also,
we demean all control variables so that the constant a0 can be interpreted as the level of
the attention variable in expansions, and a1 indicates how much the variable increases in
recessions.
The first attention variable we examine is reliance on aggregate information, RAI, as in
equation (10). We proxy for the aggregate payoff shock with the innovation in log industrial
production growth.16 A time series for RAIjt is obtained by computing the covariance of the
innovations and each fund j’s portfolio weights using twelve-month rolling windows. Our
hypothesis is that RAI should be higher in recessions, which means that the coefficient on
Recession, a1, should be positive.
Our estimates of the parameters appear in Table 2. Column 1 shows the results for a
univariate regression. In expansions, RAI is not different from zero, implying that funds’
portfolios do not comove with future macroeconomic information in those periods. In reces-
sions, RAI increases. Both findings are consistent with the model. The increase amounts
to ten percent of a standard deviation of RAI. It is measured precisely, with a t-statistic of
3. To remedy the possibility of a bias in the coefficient due to omitted fund characteristics
correlated with recession times, we turn to a multivariate regression. Our findings, presented
in Column 2, remain largely unaffected by the inclusion of the control variables.
Next, we repeat our analysis using funds’ reliance on stock-specific information (RSI)
as a dependent variable. Using equation (12), the RSI metric is computed in each month
t as a cross-sectional covariance across the assets between the fund’s portfolio weights and
firm-specific earnings shocks.17 In the model, the fund’s portfolio holdings and its returns
covary more with subsequent firm-specific shocks in expansions. Therefore, our hypothesis
16We regress log industrial production growth at t+1 on log industrial production growth in month t, and
use the residual from this regression. Because industrial production growth is nearly i.i.d, the same results
obtain if we simply use the log change in industrial production between t and t+ 1.
17We regress earnings per share in a given quarter on earnings per share in the previous quarter (earnings
are reported quarterly), and use the residual from this regression. Suppose month t and t + 3 are end-of-
quarter months. Then RSI in months t, t+ 1, and t+ 2 are computed using portfolio weights from month t
and earnings surprises from month t+ 3.
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is that RSI should fall in recessions, meaning that a1 should be negative.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 show that the average RSI across funds is positive in
expansions and substantially lower in recessions. The effect is statistically significant at the
1% level. It is also economically significant: RSI decreases by approximately ten percent
of one standard deviation. Overall, the data support the model’s prediction that portfolio
holdings are more sensitive to aggregate shocks in recessions and more sensitive to firm-
specific shocks in expansions.
Next, we examine market-timing, Timingjt , and stock-picking ability, Picking
j
t , defined
in equations (11) and (13). The benefit of using these variables is that they have an exact
analog in the model. In contrast, for RAI and RSI, we need to take a stance on the empirical
proxy for the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. The stock betas, βi, in Timing and Picking
are computed using the twelve-month rolling-window regressions of stock excess returns on
market excess returns.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 show that the average market-timing ability across funds
increases significantly in recessions. In turn, we find no evidence of market timing in ex-
pansions. Since expansion months make up the bulk of our sample, this result is consistent
with the literature which fails to find evidence for market timing, on average. However, we
find that market timing is positive and statistically different from zero in recessions. The
increase is 25 percent of a standard deviation of the Timing measure, which is economically
meaningful. Likewise, Columns 7 and 8 show that stock-picking ability deteriorates substan-
tially in recessions, again consistent with the theory. The reduction in recessions is about 20
percent of a standard deviation of the Picking measure.
Table S.5 performs several robustness checks. First, we compute an alternative RAI
measure, in which the aggregate shock is proxied by surprises in non-farm employment
growth, another salient macroeconomic variable, instead of industrial production growth.
Second, we compute an alternative RSI measure in which earnings surprises are defined as
the residual from a regression of earnings per share in a given year on earnings per share
in that same quarter one year earlier (instead of one quarter earlier), as in Bernard and
Thomas (1989). Third, to check the market-timing results, we also study the R2 from a
CAPM regression at the fund level, as in equation (16). It measures how the funds’ excess
returns (as opposed to their portfolio weights) covary with the aggregate state, as measured
by the market’s excess return. All the results are similar to our benchmark result, and in
the case of employment growth, are estimated even more precisely.
To further understand how funds improve their market timing in recessions, we conduct
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several exercises. We find they increase their cash holdings, reduce their holdings of high-
beta stocks, and tilt their portfolios towards more defensive sectors. Tables S.6, S.7, and S.8
present the results; a more detailed discussion is in Appendix S.3.1.
2.4 Testing Hypothesis 2: Dispersion
The second prediction of the model is that heterogeneity in fund investment strategies and
portfolio returns rises in recessions. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following re-
gression specification, using various return and investment heterogeneity measures, denoted
as Dispersionjt , the dispersion of fund j at month t.
Dispersionjt = b0 + b1Recessiont + b2X
j
t + ²
j
t , (18)
The definitions of Recession and other control variables mirror those in regression (17). Our
coefficient of interest is b1.
We begin by examining dispersion in investment strategies. The results are in Table
3. Our first measure is a fund’s portfolio Concentration, defined in equation (15). Funds
whose holdings deviate more from the S&P 500 portfolio, and therefore from other investors,
have higher levels of portfolio concentration; they pursue more active investment strategies.
In contrast, when all funds hold the market portfolio, average concentration and portfo-
lio dispersion are zero. The results, in Columns 1 and 2, indicate an increase in average
Concentration across funds in recessions. The increase is statistically significant at the 1%
level. It is also economically significant: The value of stock concentration in recessions goes
up by about 15% of a standard deviation.
An alternative way to assess a fund’s concentration level is to look at its degree of idiosyn-
cratic risk. A more concentrated portfolio carries more idiosyncratic risk, σjε, according to
the CAPM regression (16). Columns 3 and 4 show that the idiosyncratic volatility increases
in recessions. The increase is highly significant, statistically and economically. One concern
with the CAPM-based measure of idiosyncratic risk is that it might not capture the possi-
bility that some fund returns load on passive factors besides the market return. Therefore,
we recompute idiosyncratic volatility, controlling for a fund’s exposure to size (SMB), value
(HML), and momentum (UMD) factors. The resulting Recession coefficient in a univariate
regression is 0.347 and the intercept is 1.189. Controlling for fund characteristics changes
the coefficients by 1% or less.
Since dispersion in fund strategies should generate dispersion in fund returns, we next
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look for evidence of higher return dispersion in recessions. To measure dispersion in return
variable X, we use the absolute deviation between fund j’s value and the equally weighted
cross-sectional average, |Xjt − X t|, as the dependent variable in (18). Columns 5 and 6
of Table 3 present the results for the dispersion in the funds’ CAPM alphas, which are
obtained from twelve-month rolling-window regressions of fund excess returns on market
excess returns. Comparing the slope b1 to the intercept b0, we find a 50% dispersion increase
in recessions. The effect is measured precisely. Columns 7 through 8 show that using four-
factor alphas in place of CAPM alphas does not change the result. Finally, Columns 9
and 10 show that the CAPM-beta dispersion also increases by about 30% in recessions,
as investment managers take different directional bets in their investment strategies. The
increased dispersions in abnormal returns, alphas, and betas are all consistent with the
predictions of our model.
Table S.9 (in the Appendix) considers additional measures of portfolio and return disper-
sion. For example, we show that managers shift their investment styles more in recessions,
consistent with more active portfolio management. Their funds also exhibit greater industry
concentration in recessions. Next, we show that the dispersion of fund returns minus the
market return nearly doubles in recessions. In unreported results, we obtain similar results
for the dispersion of CAPM alpha and betas that are calculated by estimating their depen-
dence on the aggregate dividend-price ratio, the term spread, the short-term interest rate,
and the default spread, in one full-sample regression (Avramov and Wermers 2006). Finally,
we study the dispersion in the information ratio, defined as the ratio of the CAPM alpha to
the CAPM residual volatility. These results further strengthen the evidence of the increased
dispersion in recessions.
2.5 Testing Hypothesis 3: Performance
The third prediction of our model is that recessions are times when information allows funds
to earn higher average risk-adjusted returns, on average. We evaluate this hypothesis using
the following regression specification:
Performancejt = c0 + c1Recessiont + c2X
j
t + ²
j
t (19)
where Performancejt denotes the fund j’s performance in month t using previously in-
troduced measures of abnormal fund returns, CAPM, three-factor, and four-factor alphas.
Recession and the control variables, X, are defined as before. All returns are expressed net
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of management fees. Our coefficient of interest is c1.
Table 4, Column 1, shows that the average fund’s net return is 3bp per month less
than the market return in expansions, but it is 34bp per month higher in recessions. This
difference is highly statistically significant and becomes even larger (42bp), after we control
for fund characteristics (Column 2). Similar results (Columns 3 and 4) obtain when we use
the CAPM alpha as a measure of fund performance, except that the alpha in expansions
becomes negative. When we use alphas based on the three-factor and four-factor models,
the recession return premium diminishes (Columns 5 through 8). But in recessions, the
four-factor alpha still represents a non-trivial 1% per year risk-adjusted excess return, 1.6%
higher than the -0.6% recorded in expansions (significant at the 1% level).
The cross-sectional regression model allows us to include a host of fund-specific control
variables, making use of rich panel data. But because performance is measured using past
twelve-month rolling-window regressions, a given observation for the dependent variable can
be classified as a recession when some or even all of the remaining eleven months of the
window are expansions. To verify the robustness of our results, we also employ a time-series
approach. In each month, we form the equally weighted portfolio of funds and calculate
its net return, in excess of the risk-free rate. We then regress this time series of fund
portfolio returns on Recession and common risk factors. We adjust standard errors for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West 1987). Table S.10 shows that our
previous results remain largely unchanged.
Our results are robust to alternative performance measures. Table S.11 uses gross fund
returns and alphas. In unreported results, we also use the information ratio (the ratio of
the CAPM alpha to the CAPM residual volatility) as a performance measure. It increases
sharply in recessions. Finally, we find similar results when we lead alpha on the left-hand
side by one month instead of using a contemporaneous alpha. All results point in the same
direction: Outperformance clusters in periods of recessions.
2.6 Identifying Recessions
So far, we have measured the state of the business cycle using an indicator variable based
on the NBER definition of recessions. While this choice seems quite natural in light of its
salience as an indicator of observed economic activity, it suffers from two potential prob-
lems. First, the information on NBER recessions is available only after the recession has
already started. Second, measuring business cycles using a discrete variable contains less
information than using a continuous counterpart. To address these concerns, we confirmed
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our results using various contemporaneous recession indicators such as a dummy for negative
real consumption growth, or, alternatively, for the 25% lowest stock market returns. We also
assessed the robustness of our results using the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CF-
NAI), a continuous and contemporaneous indicator of the strength of economic activity, as
our independent variable. Table S.12 shows that the results on performance are, if anything,
stronger than those for our baseline measure. The other two hypotheses, on RAI/RSI and
on dispersion, also hold for the CFNAI, but are omitted for brevity.
Another question is whether recession is the right conditioning variable. Since a key
feature of recessions is high payoff volatility, we could replace the recession indicator with a
dummy variable for high payoff volatility. The latter equals one in months with the highest
volatility of aggregate earnings growth.18 As predicted by the theory, we find that RAI,
dispersion, and performance all rise in high volatility months, while RSI falls. For illustration,
Table S.13 describes the performance results. Yet, we prefer to think of attention allocation
as a cyclical phenomenon and believe that using our current definition of recession is more
suitable, for the following reasons. First, it allows us to make contact with the existing
macroeconomics literature on rational inattention, e.g., Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2009a,
2009b). Second, our data suggests that attention allocation is more of a cyclical phenomenon:
Cyclical attention reallocation is more pronounced than volatility-based attention allocation.
Third, periods of low and high economic activity are common knowledge whereas measuring
earnings volatility requires paying close attention to aggregate earnings data, which our
theory predicts not all managers choose to do. A downturn in economic activity has such
wide-ranging implications for investors, and as a binary variable, is so easy to learn, that
knowing about the start or end of a recession is almost inescapable.
3 Using Theory and Data to Identify Skilled Managers
Our analysis so far shows that the data are consistent with the three main predictions
of the model. This suggests we can use it to identify skilled investment managers. In
particular, we exploit the model’s prediction that skilled managers display market-timing
ability in recessions and stock-picking ability in expansions. We define market-timing and
stock-picking ability as in equations (11) and (13). Since the funds’ portfolio holdings in
each stock are observed at most quarterly, we assume that funds use buy-and-hold strategies
18We chose the volatility cutoff such that 12% of months are selected, the same fraction as NBER recession
months.
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in non-disclosure periods. In these periods, the portfolio weights, wjit, would only vary to
the extent that market prices vary.
3.1 The Same Managers Do Switch Strategies
We first test the prediction that the same investment managers with stock-picking ability in
expansions display market-timing ability in recessions. To this end, we first identify funds
with superior stock-picking ability in expansions: For all expansion months, we select all
fund-month observations that are in the highest 25% of the Pickingjt distribution. We form
an indicator variable Skill Picking (SPj ∈ {0, 1}) that is equal to 1 for the 25% of funds (884
funds) with the highest fraction of observations in the top, relative to the total number of
observations (in expansions) for that fund. Then, we estimate the following pooled regression
model, separately for expansions and recessions:
Abilityjt = d0 + d1SP
j
t + d2X
j
t + ²
j
t , (20)
where Ability denotes either Timing or Picking. X is a vector of previously defined control
variables. Our coefficient of interest is d1.
Table 5, Column 3, confirms that SP funds are significantly better at picking stocks in
expansions, after controlling for fund characteristics. This is true by construction. The main
point, however, is that these same SP funds are also good at market timing in recessions.
This result is evident from the recession-based market-timing regression in Column 2, in
which the coefficient on SP is statistically significant at the 5% level. Finally, we note that
the funds in SP do not exhibit superior market-timing ability in expansions (Column 1) nor
superior stock-picking ability in recessions (Column 4), which confirms that SP funds switch
strategies.
Having identified a subset of skilled funds based on their time-varying investment strate-
gies, the model predicts that this group should outperform the unskilled funds not only in
recessions but also in expansions. Table 6 compares the unconditional performance of the
SP portfolio to that composed of all other funds. After controlling for various fund char-
acteristics, the CAPM, three-factor, and four-factor alphas are 70-90 basis points per year
higher for the SP portfolio, a difference that is statistically and economically significant.
In Panel A of Table 7, we further compare the characteristics of the funds in the Skill-
Picking portfolio to those not included in the portfolio. We note several salient differences.
First, funds in SP are on average younger (by five years). Second, they have less wealth
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under management (by $400 million), suggestive of decreasing returns to scale at the fund
level, as in Berk and Green (2004) and Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004). Third,
they tend to charge higher expenses (by 0.26% per year), suggesting rent extraction from
customers for the skill they provide. Fourth, they exhibit much higher turnover rates (about
130% per year, versus 80% per year for other funds), consistent with their more active-
management styles. Fifth, they receive higher inflows of new assets to manage, consistent
with their superior performance, and presumably a market-based reflection of their skill.
Sixth, the SP funds tend to hold more concentrated portfolios, with fewer stocks and higher
stock-level and industry-level Herfindahl concentration. Seventh, their betas deviate more
from their peers suggesting a strategy with different systematic risk exposure. Finally, they
rely significantly more on aggregate information. Taken together, these findings begin to
paint a picture of what a typical skilled fund looks like.
To what extent can observable characteristics predict skill (SP )? Table S.14 reports the
estimates from a linear-probability regression model of the SP indicator on fund character-
istics, such as age, TNA, expenses, and turnover. The regression R2 equals 14%. Including
attributes that our theory links to skilled managers, such as stock and industry concen-
tration, beta deviation, and RAI, increases the R2 to 19%. Table 7, Panel B, examines
manager characteristics. SP fund managers are 2.6% more likely to have an MBA, are one
year younger, and have 1.7 fewer years of experience. Interestingly, they are much more
likely to depart for hedge funds later in their careers, suggesting that the market judges
them to have superior skills.
The existence of skilled mutual funds with cyclical learning and investment strategies is
not a fragile result. First, the results continue to hold if we change the cutoff levels for the
inclusion in the SP portfolio. Second, we show that the top 25% RSI funds in expansions have
higher RAIs in recessions and higher unconditional alphas (Tables S.15 and S.16). Third,
we verify our results using Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)’s definitions of
market timing (CT) and stock picking (CS). Finally, we reverse the sort, to show that funds
in the top 25% of market-timing ability in recessions, have statistically higher stock-picking
ability in expansions and higher unconditional alphas (Tables S.17 and S.18).
3.2 Creating a Skill Index
If one is going to use the model to identify skilled investment managers, it is important that
she can identify these managers in real time, without looking at the full sample of the data.
To this end, we construct a Skill Index that is informed by the main predictions of our model
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that attention allocation and investment strategies change over the business cycle. We define
the Skill Index as a weighted average of Timing and Picking measures, in which the weights
we place on each measure depend on the state of the business cycle:
Skill Indexjt(z) = w(zt)Timing
j
t + (1− w(zt))Pickingjt , with zt ∈ {E,R}.
We demean Timing and Picking, divide each by its standard deviation, and set w(R) =
0.8 > w(E) = 0.2 (the exact number is not crucial).
Subsequently, we examine whether the time-t Index can predict future fund performance,
measured by the CAPM, three-factor, and four-factor alphas one month (and one year)
later. Table 8 shows that funds with a higher Skill Index have on average higher alphas.
For example, when Skill Index is zero (its mean), the alpha is -4bp per month. However,
when the Skill Index is one standard deviation (0.83%) above its mean, the alpha is 1.1%
(four-factor) or 2.4% (CAPM) higher per year. The three most right columns show similar
predictive power of the Skill Index for one-year ahead alphas. As a robustness check, we
construct a second skill index based on RAI and RSI instead of Timing and Picking.
A one-standard-deviation increase in this skill index increases one-month-ahead alphas by
0.3-0.5% per year, a statistically significant effect (Table S.19).
A large literature investigates whether measures of skill persist through time (e.g., Carhart
(1997), Brown and Goetzmann (1995)). To investigate whether the skill we identify exhibits
persistence, we sort funds into quintiles based on their values of the Skill Index. We then
track the Skill Index of the funds in each quintile over the next twelve months. Figure 3
shows a substantial amount of skill persistence, which is slowly declining over time. One
interesting observation is that the best funds display the most persistence, which is in con-
trast with most of the literature, which usually finds persistence among the worst but not
the best funds.
4 Alternative Explanations
We briefly explore other candidate explanations. The first alternative is that no skill exists.
In that case, all the recession effects in fund returns would have to arise mechanically from
the properties of asset returns. To rule this out, we calculate means, volatilities, alphas,
betas, and idiosyncratic volatilities of individual stock returns, in the same way as we do it
for mutual fund returns. None of these moments differ between expansions and recessions
(except for higher volatility of asset returns in recessions, our driving force). Using a simu-
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lation, we verify that a mechanical mutual fund investment policy that randomly selects 50,
75, or 100 stocks cannot produce the observed counter-cyclical fund returns.
Second, we consider labor market explanations. In recessions, fund managers’ labor-
market options deteriorate. Not only do their assets under management and therefore their
wages shrink, they are also less likely to get promoted or picked off by a hedge fund and more
likely to get fired or demoted (Table S.20). In a model with risk-averse investment managers
who are compensated based on their relative performance, larger downsides and smaller
upsides would make optimal investment choices more conservative and less dispersed. To
see why, imagine that a manager implements a small deviation from the strategy of all other
managers; then she has an approximately 50% chance of underperforming. If fewer than 50%
of managers are fired, following peers is better. The opposite is true in expansions: There is
a lot of upside and little downside, giving managers incentives to gamble and deviate from
the pack, in an attempt to get promoted. This explanation counterfactually generates higher
portfolio dispersion in expansions. While labor market considerations may be important to
understand many aspects of the behavior of mutual fund managers, the above argument
suggests that they cannot account for the dispersion patterns we document.
Another labor-market explanation could be that the quality of fund managers improves
during recessions because better fund managers survive (or self-select) into the mutual fund
industry in such periods. We find no evidence for such an effect. Table S.21 shows no differ-
ence between the age, educational background or experience of our managers in recessions
versus expansions.
Fourth, Glode (2008) argues that funds outperform in recessions because their investors’
marginal utility is highest in such periods. While complementary to our explanation, his
work remains silent on what strategies investment managers pursue to achieve this differ-
ential performance, and hence on our first and second hypothesis. In sum, while various
explanations can account for some of the facts, we conclude that they cannot account for all
facts jointly.
5 Conclusion
Do investment managers add value for their clients? The answer to this question matters for
problems ranging from the discussion of market efficiency to a practical portfolio advice for
households. The large amount of randomness in financial asset returns makes it a difficult
question to answer. The multi-billion investment management business is first and foremost
28
an information-processing business. We model investment managers not only as agents
making optimal portfolio decisions, but also as ones who optimally allocate a limited amount
of attention or information-processing capacity. Since the optimal attention allocation varies
with the state of the economy, so do investment strategies and fund returns. As long as a
subset of investment managers can process information about future asset payoffs, the model
predicts a higher covariance of portfolio holdings with aggregate information, more dispersion
in returns across funds, and a higher average outperformance, in recessions. We observe these
patterns in investments and returns of actively managed U.S. mutual funds. Hence, the data
are consistent with a world in which some investment managers have skill, but that skill is
often hard to detect. Recessions are times when differences in performance are magnified
and skill is easier to detect.
Beyond the mutual fund industry, a sizeable fraction of GDP now comes from industries
that produce and process information. Increasing access to information through the internet
has made the problem of how to best allocate a limited amount of information-processing
capacity even more relevant. While information choices have consequences for real outcomes,
they are often poorly understood because they are difficult to measure. By predicting how
information choices are linked to observable variables (such as the state of the economy) and
by tying information choices to real outcomes (such as portfolio investment), we show how
models of information choices can be brought to the data. This information-choice-based
approach could be useful in examining other information-processing sectors of the economy.
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Figure 1: Cross-Sectional Distribution of Outperformance
This figure shows the cross-sectional distribution in recessions (red) and in expansions (blue) of the four-factor alpha for the
mutual funds in our sample. The data are from CRSP and are available monthly from January 1980 until December 2005.
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Figure 2: Investment Performance in Recessions vs. Expansions
This figure shows four-factor alphas for all domestic equity mutual funds. They are obtained by, first, regressing fund returns
in excess of the risk-free rate on the market return in excess of the risk-free rate, the return on a portfolio that is long in small
firms and short in large firms (SMB), the return on a portfolio that is long in value firms and short in growth firms (HML), and
the return on a portfolio that is long in winners and short in losers (UMD) in twelve-month rolling-window regressions. The
fund alpha is the intercept of that regression. In a second step, we regress the fund alphas on a recession indicator variable in
a panel regression, controlling for other fund characteristics. The intercept of that regression is the alpha in expansions, the
sum of the coefficient on the dummy and the intercept is the alpha in recessions. We annualize monthly alphas by multiplying
them by twelve. The data are from CRSP and available monthly from January 1980 until December 2005.
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Figure 3: Skill Index Persistence
In a given month, all funds are ranked into quintiles based on their Skill Index, defined as Skill Indexjt (z) = w(zt)Timing
j
t +
(1−w(zt))Pickingjt , with zt ∈ {E,R}. Skill Index is standardized cross-sectionally to have mean zero and standard deviation
one. We then compute and plot the Skill Index of the funds in each quintile in the subsequent twelve months. The data cover
the period from January 1980 until December 2005.
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Table 1: Individual Stocks Have More Aggregate Risk in Recessions
For each stock i and each month t, we estimate a CAPM equation based on twelve months of data (a twelve-
month rolling-window regression). This estimation delivers the stock’s beta, βit , and its residual standard
deviation, σiεt. We define stock i’s aggregate risk in month t as
∣∣βitσmt ∣∣ and its idiosyncratic risk as σiεt, where
σmt is formed as the realized volatility from daily return observations. Panel A reports the results from a
time-series regression of the aggregate risk averaged across stocks, 1N
∑N
i=1
∣∣βitσmt ∣∣, in Columns 1 and 2, and
of the idiosyncratic risk averaged across stocks, 1N
∑N
i=1 σ
i
εt, in Columns 3 and 4 on Recession. Recession is
an indicator variable equal to one for every month the economy is in a recession according to the NBER, and
zero otherwise. In Columns 2 and 4 we include several aggregate control variables: We regress the portfolio
(net) return in excess of the risk-free rate on Recession and a set of four risk factors: the market excess
return (MKTPREM), the return on the small-minus-big portfolio (SMB), the return on the high-minus-low
book-to-market portfolio (HML), the return on the up-minus-down momentum portfolio (UMD). The data
are monthly and cover the period 1980 to 2005 (309 months). Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Panel B reports results of panel regressions of the aggregate
risk of an individual stock,
∣∣βitσmt ∣∣, in Columns 1 and 2 and of its idiosyncratic risk, σiεt, in Columns 3
and 4 on Recession. In Columns 2 and 4 we include several firm-specific control variables: the log market
capitalization of the stock, log(Size), the ratio of book equity to market equity, B −M , the average return
over the past year, Momentum, the stock’s leverage, Leverage, measured as the ratio of book debt to book
debt plus book equity, and an indicator variable, NASDAQ, equal to one if the stock is traded on NASDAQ.
All control variables are lagged one month. The data are monthly and cover all stocks in the CRSP universe
for the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the stock and time dimensions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggregate Risk Idiosyncratic Risk
Panel A: Time-Series Regression
Recession 0.213 0.207 0.058 0.016
(0.120) (0.118) (1.018) (1.016)
MKTPREM -0.678 -1.865
(0.487) (3.043)
SMB 1.251 12.045
(0.593) (4.293)
HML 0.015 9.664
(0.842) (8.150)
UMD -0.684 -1.112
(0.372) (3.888)
Constant 0.475 0.484 13.229 13.196
(0.030) (0.031) (0.286) (0.276)
Observations 309 309 309 309
Panel B: Pooled Regression
Recession 0.212 0.253 0.064 0.510
(0.058) (0.057) (0.493) (0.580)
Log(Size) -0.029 -1.544
(0.004) (0.037)
B-M Ratio -0.160 -2.691
(0.012) (0.086)
Momentum 0.029 2.059
(0.021) (0.177)
Leverage -0.095 -1.006
(0.015) (0.119)
NASDAQ 0.150 1.937
(0.017) (0.105)
Constant 0.447 0.442 12.641 12.592
(0.015) (0.015) (0.122) (0.144)
Observations 1,312,216 1,312,216 1,312,216 1,312,216
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Table 2: Attention Allocation
The dependent variables are funds’ reliance on aggregate information (RAI), funds’ reliance on stock-specific
information (RSI), funds’ market-timing ability (Timing), and funds’ stock-picking ability (Picking). A fund
j’s RAIjt is defined as the (twelve-month rolling-window time-series) covariance between the funds’ holdings
in deviation from the market (wjit −wmit ) in month t and changes in industrial production growth between t
and t+1. A fund j’s RSIjt is defined as the (across stock) covariance between the funds’ holdings in deviation
from the market (wjit − wmit ) in month t and changes in earnings growth between t and t + 1. Timing is
defined as follows: Timingjt =
∑N
i=1(w
j
it−wmit )(βitRmt+1) and Pickingjt =
∑N
i=1(w
j
it−wmit )(Rit+1−βitRmt+1),
where the stocks’ βit is measured over a twelve-month rolling window. RAI, RSI, Timing, and Picking
are all multiplied by 10,000 for ease of readability. Recession is an indicator variable equal to one for every
month the economy is in a recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. Log(Age) is the natural
logarithm of fund age. Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of a fund total net assets. Expenses is the fund
expense ratio. Turnover is the fund turnover ratio. Flow is the percentage growth in a fund’s new money.
Load is the total fund load. The last three control variables measure the style of a fund along the size,
value, and momentum dimensions, calculated from the scores of the stocks in their portfolio in that month.
They are omitted for brevity. All control variables are demeaned. Flow and Turnover are winsorized at the
1% level. The data are monthly and cover the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the fund and time dimensions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RAI RSI Timing Picking
Recession 0.011 0.011 -0.682 -0.696 0.140 0.139 -0.144 -0.146
(0.004) (0.004) (0.159) (0.150) (0.070) (0.068) (0.047) (0.047)
Log(Age) -0.002 0.423 0.006 0.004
(0.001) (0.060) (0.006) (0.004)
Log(TNA) -0.001 -0.173 0.000 -0.003
(0.000) (0.029) (0.004) (0.003)
Expenses -0.330 88.756 1.021 -0.815
(0.244) (11.459) (1.280) (0.839)
Turnover -0.004 -0.204 0.007 0.017
(0.001) (0.053) (0.013) (0.010)
Flow -0.008 1.692 -0.001 0.058
(0.010) (0.639) (0.078) (0.088)
Load 0.017 -9.644 0.033 0.156
(0.023) (1.972) (0.180) (0.131)
Constant -0.001 -0.001 3.084 3.086 0.007 0.007 -0.010 -0.010
(0.001) (0.001) (0.069) (0.070) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 224,257 224,257 166,328 166,328 221,306 221,306 221,306 221,306
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Table 3: Dispersion in Funds’ Portfolio Strategies and Returns
The dependent variables are Concentration, Idio V ol, and |Xjt − X¯t|, where Xjt is the CAPM Alpha,
4 − Factor Alpha, or CAPM Beta, and X¯ denotes the (equally weighted) cross-sectional average.
Concentration for fund j at time t is calculated as the Herfindahl index of portfolio weights in stocks
i ∈ {1, · · · , N} in deviation from the market portfolio weights ∑Ni=1(wjit − wmit )2 × 100. Idio V ol is the
idiosyncratic volatility from a twelve-month rolling-window CAPM regression at the fund level. The CAPM
alpha (and four-factor alpha) and the CAPM beta are obtained from twelve-month rolling-window regressions
of fund-level excess returns on excess market returns (and returns on SMB, HML, and MOM). Recession
is an indicator variable equal to one for every month the economy is in a recession according to the NBER,
and zero otherwise. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age. Log(TNA) is the logarithm of a fund
total net assets. Expenses is the fund expense ratio. Flow is the percentage growth in a fund’s new money.
Turnover is the fund turnover ratio. Load is the total fund load. The last three control variables measure
the style of a fund along the size, value, and momentum dimensions, calculated from the scores of the stocks
in their portfolio in that month. They are omitted for brevity. All control variables are demeaned. Flow
and Turnover are winsorized at the 1% level. The data are monthly and cover the period 1980 to 2005.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the fund and time dimensions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Concentration Idio Vol CAPM Alpha 4-Factor Alpha CAPM Beta
Recession 0.205 0.147 0.348 0.359 0.275 0.298 0.140 0.150 0.082 0.083
(0.027) (0.026) (0.127) (0.104) (0.054) (0.050) (0.028) (0.025) (0.015) (0.014)
Log(Age) 0.203 -0.181 -0.045 -0.011 -0.009
(0.028) (0.017) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Log(TNA) -0.179 0.039 0.017 -0.006 0.003
(0.014) (0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Expenses 28.835 54.365 9.468 8.58 5.460
(4.860) (2.806) (0.658) (0.468) (0.235)
Turnover -0.092 0.358 0.050 0.059 0.020
(0.025) (0.023) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Flow 0.122 0.196 0.315 0.242 0.022
(0.104) (0.174) (0.053) (0.032) (0.017)
Load -1.631 -5.562 -1.123 -0.420 -0.444
(0.907) (0.490) (0.095) (0.070) (0.042)
Constant 1.525 1.524 2.103 2.104 0.586 0.585 0.497 0.497 0.229 0.229
(0.024) (0.022) (0.071) (0.068) (0.018) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 230,185 230,185 227,159 227,159 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745 227,159 227,159
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Table 4: Fund Performance: Cross-Section Approach
The dependent variables are funds’ Abnormal Return, CAPM Alpha, 3 − Factor Alpha, and 4 − Factor
Alpha. All are obtained from twelve-month rolling-window regressions of fund-level excess returns on excess
market returns for the CAPM alpha, additionally on the SMB and the HML factors for the three-factor
alpha, and additionally on the UMD factor for the four-factor alpha. The abnormal return is the fund return
minus the market return. Recession is an indicator variable equal to one for every month the economy is
in a recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age.
Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of a fund total net assets. Expenses is the fund expense ratio. Flow
is the percentage growth in a fund’s new money. Turnover is the fund turnover ratio. Load is the total
fund load. The last three control variables measure the style of a fund along the size, value, and momentum
dimension, calculated from the scores of the stocks in their portfolio in that month. They are omitted for
brevity. All control variables are demeaned. Flow and Turnover are winsorized at the 1% level. The data
are monthly and cover the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the fund
and time dimensions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Abnormal Return CAPM Alpha 3-Factor Alpha 4-Factor Alpha
Recession 0.342 0.425 0.337 0.404 0.043 0.073 0.107 0.139
(0.056) (0.058) (0.048) (0.047) (0.034) (0.028) (0.041) (0.032)
Log(Age) -0.031 -0.036 -0.028 -0.039
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(TNA) 0.046 0.033 0.009 0.012
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Expenses -1.811 -2.372 -7.729 -7.547
(1.046) (0.945) (0.782) (0.745)
Turnover -0.023 -0.044 -0.074 -0.065
(0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
Flow 2.978 2.429 1.691 1.536
(0.244) (0.172) (0.097) (0.096)
Load -0.809 -0.757 -0.099 -0.335
(0.226) (0.178) (0.131) (0.141)
Constant -0.027 -0.033 -0.059 -0.063 -0.059 -0.060 -0.050 -0.052
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021)
Observations 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745
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Table 5: Same Funds with Stock-Picking Ability in Expansions Have Market-
Timing Ability in Recessions
We divide all fund-month observations into Recession and Expansion subsamples. Recession is an indicator
variable equal to one for every month the economy is in a recession according to the NBER, and zero
otherwise; Expansion is equal to one every month the economy is not in recession. The dependent variables
are our measure of a fund’s market timing, Timingjt , and our measure of the fund’s stock-picking ability,
Pickingjt . They are defined as follows: Timing
j
t =
∑N
i=1(w
j
it − wmit )(βiRmt+1) and Pickingjt =
∑N
i=1(w
j
it −
wmit )(R
i
t+1−βiRmt+1). Skill P icking is an indicator variable equal to one for all funds whose Picking measure
in Expansion is in the highest 25th percentile of the distribution, and zero otherwise. Log(Age) is the natural
logarithm of fund age. Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of a fund total net assets. Expenses is the fund
expense ratio. Flow is the percentage growth in a fund’s new money. Turnover is the fund turnover ratio.
Load is the total fund load. The last three control variables measure the style of a fund along the size,
value, and momentum dimensions, calculated from the scores of the stocks in their portfolio in that month.
They are omitted for brevity. All control variables are demeaned. Flow and Turnover are winsorized at
the 1% level. The data are monthly and cover the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the fund and time dimensions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Timing Stock Picking
Expansion Recession Expansion Recession
Skill Picking 0.000 0.017 0.056 -0.096
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.017)
Log(Age) 0.009 -0.025 -0.001 0.029
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
Log(TNA) -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.023
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Expenses 0.868 1.374 -1.291 -4.434
(0.321) (1.032) (0.376) (1.378)
Turnover 0.009 -0.011 0.017 -0.006
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.012)
Flow 0.056 -0.876 0.138 -0.043
(0.024) (0.112) (0.037) (0.093)
Load 0.094 -0.076 0.131 0.615
(0.049) (0.151) (0.055) (0.195)
Constant 0.016 0.059 -0.021 -0.148
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
Observations 204,330 18,354 204,330 18,354
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Table 6: Unconditional Performance of “Skill-Picking” Funds
We divide all fund-month observations into Recession and Expansion subsamples. Expansion equals one
every month the economy is not in recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. We define the stock
picking ability of a fund as Pickingjt =
∑N
i=1(w
j
it − wmit )(Rit+1 − βiRmt+1). Skill Picking, SP , is an indicator
variable equal to one for all funds whose Picking measure in Expansion is in the highest 25th percentile of
the distribution, and zero otherwise. The dependent variables are the CAPM alpha, three-factor alpha, or
four-factor alpha of the mutual fund, obtained from a twelve-month rolling-window regression of a fund’s
excess returns before expenses on a set of common risk factors. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of fund
age. Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of a fund’s total net assets. Expenses is the fund expense ratio.
Flow is the percentage growth in a fund’s new money. Turnover is the fund turnover ratio. Load is the total
fund load. The last three control variables measure the style of a fund along the size, value, and momentum
dimensions, calculated from the scores of the stocks in their portfolio in that month. They are omitted for
brevity. All control variables are demeaned. Flow and Turnover are winsorized at the 1% level. The data
are monthly and cover the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the fund
and time dimensions.
(1) (2) (3)
CAPM Alpha 3-Factor Alpha 4-Factor Alpha
Skill Picking 0.076 0.056 0.064
(0.040) (0.021) (0.018)
Log(Age) -0.039 -0.028 -0.038
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(TNA) 0.032 0.013 0.014
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Expenses 4.956 0.627 0.241
(1.066) (0.793) (0.739)
Turnover -0.009 -0.047 -0.041
(0.014) (0.012) (0.009)
Flow 2.579 1.754 1.602
(0.173) (0.102) (0.101)
Load -0.744 -0.090 -0.289
(0.214) (0.136) (0.145)
Constant 0.057 0.038 0.049
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018)
Observations 227,183 227,183 227,183
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Table 7: Comparing “Skill-Picking” Funds to Other Funds
We divide all fund-month observations into Recession and Expansion subsamples. Expansion equals one
every month the economy is not in recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. We define the
stock picking ability of a fund as Pickingjt =
∑N
i=1(w
j
it−wmit )(Rit+1−βiRmt+1). Skill P icking is an indicator
variable equal one for all funds whose Picking measure in Expansion is in the highest 25th percentile of
the distribution, and zero otherwise. Panel A reports fund-level characteristics. Age is the fund age in
years. TNA is the fund’s total net assets. Expenses is the fund expense ratio. Turnover is the fund
turnover ratio. Flows is the fund’s net inflow of new assets to manage. Concentration is the concentration
of the fund’s portfolio, measured as the Herfindahl index of portfolio weights in deviation from the market
portfolio’s weights. Stock Number is the number of stocks in the fund’s portfolio. Industry is the industry
concentration of the fund’s portfolio, measured as the Herfindahl index of portfolio weights in a given industry
in deviation from the market portfolio’s weights. Beta Deviation is the absolute difference between the fund’s
beta and the average beta in its style category. RAI is the manager reliance on aggregate information, defined
as the R-squared from the regression of the fund’s portfolio returns on contemporaneous changes in industrial
production. Panel B reports manager-level characteristics. MBA equals one if the manager obtained an
MBA degree, and zero otherwise. Ivy equals one if the manager graduated from an Ivy League institution,
and zero otherwise. Age is the fund manager age in years. Experience is the fund manager experience in
years. Gender equals one if the manager is a male and zero if the manager is female. Hedge Fund equals one
if the manager ever departed to a hedge fund, and zero otherwise. SP1− SP0 is the difference between the
mean values of the groups for which Skill P icking equals one and zero, respectively. The data are monthly
and cover the period 1980 to 2005. p− values measure statistical significance of the difference.
Skill Picking = 1 Skill Picking = 0 Difference
Mean Stdev. Median Mean Stdev. Median SP1-SP0 p-value
Panel A: Fund Characteristics
Age 10.01 8.91 7 15.20 15.34 9 -5.19 0.000
TNA 621.13 2027.04 129.60 1019.45 4024.29 162.90 -398.32 0.002
Expenses 1.48 0.47 1.42 1.22 0.47 1.17 0.26 0.000
Turnover 130.41 166.44 101.00 79.89 116.02 58.00 50.52 0.000
Flows 0.22 7.39 -0.76 -0.07 6.47 -0.73 0.300 0.008
Concentration 1.68 1.60 1.29 1.33 1.50 0.99 0.35 0.000
Stock Number 90.83 110.20 68 111.86 187.13 69 -21.03 0.000
Industry 8.49 7.90 6.39 5.37 7.54 3.54 3.12 0.000
Beta Deviation 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.13 0.23 0.10 0.05 0.000
RAI 4.13 5.93 1.82 2.77 3.97 1.26 1.37 0.000
Panel B: Fund Manager Characteristics
MBA 42.09 49.37 0 39.49 48.88 0 2.60 0.128
Ivy 25.36 43.51 0 27.94 44.87 0 -2.57 0.205
Age 53.02 10.42 50 54.11 10.06 52 -1.08 0.081
Experience 26.45 10.01 24 28.14 10.00 26 -1.69 0.003
Gender 90.89 28.77 100 90.50 29.31 100 0.39 0.681
Hedge Fund 10.43 30.57 0 6.12 23.96 0 4.31 0.000
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Table 8: Skill Index Predicts Performance
The dependent variable is the fund’s cumulative CAPM, three-factor, or four-factor alpha, calculated from a
twelve-month rolling regression of observations in month t+2 in the three left columns and in month t+13
in the three most right columns. For each fund, we form the following skill index in month t. Skill Indexjt =
w(zt)Timing
j
t + (1 − w(zt))Pickingjt , zt ∈ {Expansion,Recession}, w(Recession)=0.8 > w(Expansion) =
0.2, where Timingjt =
1
N
∑N
i=1(w
j
it − wmit )(βiRmt+1) and Pickingjt = 1N
∑N
i=1(w
j
it − wmit )(Rit+1 − βiRmt+1).
Picking and Timing are normalized so that they are mean zero and have a standard deviation of one over
the full sample. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age. Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of a
fund total net assets. Expenses is the fund expense ratio. Flow is the percentage growth in a fund’s new
money. Turnover is the fund turnover ratio. Load is the total fund load. The last three control variables
measure the style of a fund along the size, value, and momentum dimensions, calculated from the scores of
the stocks in their portfolio in that month. They are omitted for brevity. All control variables are demeaned.
Flow and Turnover are winsorized at the 1% level. The data are monthly and cover the period 1980 to
2005. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the fund and time dimensions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One Month Ahead One Year Ahead
CAPM Alpha 3-Factor Alpha 4-Factor Alpha CAPM Alpha 3-Factor Alpha 4-Factor Alpha
Skill Index 0.239 0.118 0.107 0.224 0.104 0.106
(0.044) (0.022) (0.019) (0.031) (0.025) (0.014)
Log(Age) -0.034 -0.024 -0.036 -0.019 -0.009 -0.024
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Log(TNA) 0.026 0.010 0.011 -0.016 -0.018 -0.011
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Expenses -2.977 -7.063 -7.340 -5.793 -9.093 -9.308
(1.620) (1.004) (0.957) (1.578) (0.917) (0.887)
Turnover -0.010 -0.047 -0.039 -0.001 -0.041 -0.036
(0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.010)
Flow 2.409 1.664 1.519 0.237 0.210 0.227
(0.151) (0.097) (0.095) (0.119) (0.086) (0.071)
Load -0.762 -0.093 -0.313 -0.683 0.213 -0.044
(0.233) (0.144) (0.157) (0.225) (0.129) (0.149)
Constant -0.030 -0.055 -0.041 -0.043 -0.070 -0.056
(0.024) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022)
Observations 219,338 219,338 219,338 187,668 187,668 187,668
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